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 ‘SPECIALIST IN OMNISCIENCE’? 
NATIONALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND SIR IVOR JENNINGS’ 
ENGAGEMENT WITH CEYLON 
 
ASANGA WELIKALA1 
 
1. Introduction   
 
When Sir Ivor Jennings died in December 1965, he had accomplished within a 
relatively short life of 62 years a quantum of work that would take many others 
several lifetimes to achieve. In his primary occupation as a legal academic, he 
achieved an ‘exalted place’ in the ‘hall of fame reserved for writers on law and the 
British constitution’ by virtue not only of his sheer prolificacy, but also the recognised 
originality of his work.2 Sir Ivor’s vast contribution to his field was not restricted to 
the academic study of British and Commonwealth constitutional law, in which he was 
an early practitioner of the interdisciplinary method, for he was also a pioneer in the 
practical specialism of comparative constitution-making.3 In addition to Ceylon,4 he 
served as a constitutional advisor in Pakistan, Malaya, Singapore, Malta, the 
Maldives, Ghana, Guyana, Eritrea and Nepal: a bewildering number and diversity of 
countries in terms of their constitutional challenges.5 By the time Jennings arrived in 
Colombo in March 1941 to succeed Robert Marrs as the Principal of the University 
College of Ceylon, he had already established an exceptional academic reputation at 
the age of 38. At ‘the peak of his powers’6 at the LSE between 1929 and 1940, he had 
unleashed a ‘flood of authorship,’ 7  including two editions of The Law and the 
Constitution that would go on to become a multiple edition classic on British 
constitutional law.8  
 
This prodigious work ethic was abundantly in evidence during Jennings’ time in 
Ceylon between 1941 and 1955. While continuing to write and publish within the 
severe constraints of a colonial outpost in wartime, his main administrative task on 
appointment as Principal of the University College was to undertake its conversion 
into Ceylon’s first fully-fledged university. Jennings not only established the 
University of Ceylon and became its first Vice Chancellor, but also oversaw its 
relocation from Colombo to Peradeniya, near Kandy, the pre-colonial capital of the 
last Sinhala kingdom in the central hills of the island.9 This entailed the physical 
construction of a residential campus at Peradeniya.10 Designed, built and landscaped 
with great sensitivity to local architectural traditions and the natural beauty of the 
riverine, rolling, Kandyan countryside, the new campus provided both an outstanding 
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environment and an auspicious beginning for the fledgling university.11 It has aptly 
been described as the ‘Cambridge by the Mahaweli [river].’12 
 
In the context of Ceylon’s war effort, Jennings also served as the Deputy Civil 
Defence Commissioner13 and chaired a commission on social services.14 His work in 
the Civil Defence Department brought him into contact with its head, Oliver 
Goonetilleke (later Governor-General), and through him with the Leader of the State 
Council, D.S. Senanayake, who would become the first Prime Minister of 
independent Ceylon. As Sir Charles Jeffries has remarked, 
 
‘The control room of the Civil Defence Department was, in fact, the focal 
point of the independence movement, and it was a great help to Senanayake 
and Goonetilleke that Sir Ivor Jennings was there to give invaluable advice on 
constitutional matters.’15 
 
It was through these personal associations that Jennings came to play such a pivotal 
role in the constitutional reform process. These three men got along so well that they 
were described as forming ‘the perfect partnership’16 and ‘a triumvirate’17 (or less 
charitably, the ‘Unholy Trinity’18) that drove Ceylon’s constitutional process towards 
eventual independence in 1948. In the preface to the first edition of his The 
Constitution of Ceylon, published in 1948 and ‘designed to indicate how, in the 
opinion of its framers, the [independence] Constitution was expected to work,’ 19 
Jennings’ generous and self-effacing closing remarks are indicative of the warm 
regard in which he held his two principal Ceylonese colleagues. After outlining the 
negotiations process between 1943 and 1947, he wrote, 
 
I am indebted to the Prime Minister not only for the permission to state the 
above facts but also for the patience with which he bore the lectures of a 
constitutional lawyer for nearly five years. Some day I hope to explain in print 
how much Ceylon owes to Mr Senanayake and to Sir Oliver Goonetilleke. But 
for them Ceylon would still be a colony.’20  
 
Jennings’ close involvement and common cause with Senanayake and Goonetilleke 
drew the displeasure of both British civil servants as well the Ceylonese Left opposed 
to Senanayake’s preference for a negotiated constitutional transfer of power rather 
than outright republican independence. For the former, he had gone native and got 
‘mixed up in politics’; 21  for the latter, he was the éminence grise behind the 
conservative political elite that desired self-government in the form of Dominion 
status within the British Commonwealth, which they regarded as a neo-imperialist 
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sham.22 While the British government came eventually to appreciate Senanayake’s 
moderate brand of nationalism (and by implication, we must assume, Jennings’ role in 
supporting it) as a new model of Commonwealth co-operation in the post-war 
decolonising world, the Left proved less forgiving and would play a leading role in 
dismantling the independence constitutional settlement in 1970-2.23 Their loathing of 
the Triumvirate, and the multifarious roles that Jennings was called upon to play in 
public life as a result of his membership in it, was exemplified in the rebarbative letter 
to the Ceylon Daily News written by Dr N.M. Perera in January 1955 – as Jennings 
was leaving Ceylon for the last time – in which he was excoriated as ‘an over 
advertised mediocrity’ masquerading as ‘a specialist in omniscience.’24  
 
The Trotskyite Perera, who was independent Ceylon’s first Leader of the Opposition, 
was doubtless too far to the Left for Jennings’ tastes, but he was also a highly 
committed parliamentarist, an LSE doctoral graduate under Harold Laski’s tutelage, 
and like Jennings an early Fabian. Ironically, therefore, it would seem they had more 
in common than Jennings did with his conservative and decidedly unintellectual 
fellows in the Triumvirate. Jennings shared with Goonetilleke a working class 
background and self-made aspect, but not with Senanayake, who belonged to the 
Ceylonese elite that Patrick Gordon Walker memorably described as ‘extremely rich 
landowners with local power and influence comparable to a Whig landlord’s in 
George III’s time.’25 
 
Perhaps from the cooler perspective of hindsight, a more constructive assessment than 
Perera’s disparaging valediction is possible, even if some allowance must surely be 
made for Jennings’ aloof, cerebral, and at times querulous demeanour, which led on 
occasion to the impolitic treatment of nationalist sentiments especially when held by 
those he regarded as rabble-rousers both communalist26 and communist,27 complacent 
students,28 or inconsequential gadflies.29 In his view, national independence, like any 
other constitutional problem, was a matter to be resolved by dispassionate and 
informed engagement, not by emoting irresponsibly about the multitudinous evils of 
imperialism.30 While on the main issue of Ceylonese independence an indisputable 
and sincere progressive from a British point of view,31 he was manifestly impatient 
with the more impassioned aspects of the anti-colonial atmosphere that made the life 
of even a much more clubbable (and cricket-loving) man like Sir Allan Rose difficult 
at the time.32  
 
This chapter focuses on Jennings’ work as the constitutional advisor to the Ceylonese 
Ministers and his decisive influence on both the form and the deeper conceptual 
assumptions of the scheme that eventually became, in all significant respects, the 
 4 
independence constitution of Ceylon. This instrument has become known to posterity 
as the ‘Soulbury Constitution,’ after Lord Soulbury, the chairman of the constitutional 
commission that recommended the scheme for adoption by the British government. 
But perhaps the more accurate sobriquet for it might have been the ‘Jennings 
Constitution,’ for his distinctive ideas on the full gamut of constitutional principles, 
doctrines, and institutions associated with the Westminster model are everywhere 
reflected in the independence constitution. In this chapter I will deal with the key 
distinctive feature of this constitution: its Section 29, a ‘manner and form’ provision 
for the exercise of legislative power, which sought to protect minority rights in a 
communally plural society.33 
 
In this discussion I also hope to show, as between his LSE and Ceylon phases, the 
continuities and the differences in Jennings’ application of a general constitutional 
model – the Westminster system – to different polities and cultural contexts: that of 
Westminster proper and that of Ceylon understood as an ‘Eastminster.’34 This seeks to 
add his contribution to constitutionalism in Ceylon to the broader exercise of locating 
his work within a discrete ‘style’ of British public law, on which there has recently 
been resurgent interest.  
 
 
2. Jennings’ Approach to Self-Government in Ceylon: Normativist or 
Functionalist Constitutionalism? 
 
In his theoretical elucidation of the conceptual structures that inform accounts of 
public law thought in the British constitutional tradition, Martin Loughlin has 
discerned two main ‘styles’ of approach, which he terms the ‘normativist’ and 
‘functionalist’ styles. 35  The distinction between the normativist and functionalist 
styles is important because ‘between the ideal-typical representatives of each of these 
contrasting styles there is an almost complete lack of consensus over the fundamental 
issues of public law.’36 Thus while an individual scholar’s work could be classified as 
belonging predominantly to one or other style, in reality that work would likely not fit 
neatly in all respects with the classification. This could be due to internal 
inconsistencies, or due to disagreements or differences of emphasis with other 
scholars of the same style, or indeed, because the work overlaps between the 
seemingly oppositional styles. The overlap problem, I suggest below, occurs in 
relation to Jennings’ work in Ceylon rather more obviously than in his work on 
British constitutional law, and further, that it occurs because he takes the 
methodology of his predominantly functionalist style seriously.    
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In outline, ‘The normativist style in public law is rooted in a belief in the ideal of the 
separation of powers and in the need to subordinate the government to law.’37 By 
contrast, ‘The functionalist style … views law as a part of the apparatus of 
government. Its focus is upon law’s regulatory and facilitative functions.’ 
Functionalism therefore ‘reflects an ideal of progressive evolutionary change.’ 38 
Building on these conceptual categories, Loughlin develops two variants of political 
and legal normativism – liberal and conservative – the latter informing the ‘dominant 
tradition of conservative normativism in British public law’39 which would become 
entrenched by the early twentieth century, led by Dicey but certainly not confined to 
him.40  The challenge to this orthodoxy came from the new functionalist style of 
public law that was developed by Harold Laski, William Robson and Jennings at LSE 
in the inter-war years.41 As Loughlin notes, ‘Their basic objective was to challenge 
Dicey’s theory of the constitution. They sought both to contest his method and to 
expose the political values on which his theory rested.’42 Underlying the functionalist 
challenge was a Leftist ideological disposition; pronounced reliance on Marxist 
theory in Laski’s case, a much weaker form of collectivism in Jennings.43  
 
In The Law and the Constitution – ‘a direct challenge to Dicey’s nostrums’ 44  – 
Jennings argued that ‘Dicey’s ideas on sovereignty were overly conceptualistic and 
that his concept of the rule of law was based on an individualistic, laissez-faire 
philosophy.’45 By contrast, Jennings’ focus was on ‘an examination of the functions 
of government and, in an approach reflecting the influence of sociological positivism, 
commenced with an outline of the growing interdependence of society founded in the 
increasing division of labour.’ 46  As Loughlin further notes, for Jennings, an 
understanding of a constitution’s working ‘involves an examination of the social and 
political forces which make for changes in the ideas and habits of the population.’47 
Indeed, this approach to constitutions had deeper theoretical roots in Jennings’ 
thinking. In a discussion of institutional theory in public law, he observed that, ‘Ideas 
are the product of circumstance. They are modified and developed by changing 
economic and political conditions. The relation between them as of cause and 
consequence is obscure.’48  
 
In recent work, Loughlin has extended this exposition of the functionalist style in 
public law to situate it within the broader movement of modernism as ‘a historical 
phenomenon.’49 This recasting of functionalism as a deliberate project at modernising 
constitutional law, and bringing it in line with other modernist movements in politics, 
architecture, and the arts, has important implications for us and I will return to this in 
the discussion of nationalism below. More immediately, Loughlin’s analysis furnishes 
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us with the conceptual tools with which to formulate a view about the methodological 
and substantive predispositions that Jennings brought with him to Ceylon.  
 
The British modernists were engaged in an ideological project of securing a ‘new 
social order’ 50  that sought an explicit break with the prevailing orthodoxy of 
‘analytical legal positivism underpinned by values of classical liberalism.’ In 
Loughlin’s words,  
 
Modernists were opposed to the tenets of classical liberalism: they did not 
consider liberty and community to be opposing concepts and, far from 
viewing the extension of government into social life as a threat, they regarded 
it as an entirely progressive phenomenon.51  
 
For a functionalist like Jennings, working in the colonial context of Ceylon would 
have presented promising opportunities. On the one hand, he would have found the 
colonial state a far more interventionist entity than what conservative normativists in 
Britain wanted the metropolitan state to be; the colonial state was in fact, to use a 
Marxist sociological term, an ‘over-developed’ state. 52 The Donoughmore 
Constitution was itself a radical example of colonial modernisation, recommended by 
commissioners appointed by Lord Passfield (Sidney Webb) as the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies in Ramsay MacDonald’s Labour government. 53  Webb and 
MacDonald were the progenitors of ‘the blueprint for a new type of state’54  that 
served as the inspiration for the LSE public law modernists. Ceylon’s legal system 
was also more statute-based than in Britain – for example the entire criminal law and 
procedure, based on English law principles, had been codified in 1883 55  – and 
legislation for the functionalist was the transformative instrument of social change, 
unlike the hidebound common law. And there would not have been much difficulty in 
collaborating with Senanayake and Goonetilleke, who were notionally of the centre-
right, because they were conservatives in an era before conservatism became 
associated with the small state. In the light of all this, Radhika Coomaraswamy’s 
criticism of the ‘laissez-faire structure’ of the independence constitution is possibly an 
overzealous characterisation.56 On the other hand, the modernist in Jennings would 
have despaired of the Asian traditionalism as manifested in cultural communalism, 
and he wanted, like the Donoughmore commissioners, to encourage political nation-
building, but unlike them, through a more conventional framework of parliamentary 
government.  
 
In constitutional drafting, the functionalist influence is most visible in Jennings’ 
disapproval of the idea of a constitutionally entrenched and justiciable bill of rights. 
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While such a liberal normativist device would also be inconsistent with Diceyan 
normativists’ commitment to parliamentary sovereignty, both schools of normativism 
were in general reliant on the ‘common law method’57 which entailed a prominent 
role for the courts in the legal and political system. Functionalists were opposed to 
normativism and the ‘common law method’ because they saw in this tradition’s 
commitments to the property-owning values of classical liberalism a way of retarding 
social progress and ‘Active judicial review came to be viewed as a technique for 
preserving the old order.’58 Law for the modernists was not ‘a repository of ancient 
mysteries and timeless values’ 59  but a functional instrument, or ‘the technology 
through which the modern state was to be erected.’ 60  In this practical task, the 
common law method and judicial intervention were a hindrance. As Jennings 
observed in Local Government in the Modern Constitution, ‘It is a remarkable fact 
that so often a decision of a court acts as a spanner in the middle of delicate 
machinery.’61  
 
In The Constitution of Ceylon, he deals with the issue tersely. He observes that the 
insertion of ‘fundamental rights’ into a constitution had become ‘common practice’ 
since the American bill of rights and cites the Indian constitution as his example. He 
does not explain in detail why a bill of rights was not considered in Ceylon, or even if 
it was discussed, except to say that, ‘The difficulty of all such clauses is that they 
have to use general language whose meaning can be ascertained only by litigation. 
Challenging the validity of legislation has become a major industry in the United 
States and in India.’62 This is a markedly more practical rationale than the ideological 
grounds on which he would presumably have objected to a judicially supervised bill 
of rights in Britain. But this is neither a helpful explanation nor a particularly coherent 
position given that the independence constitution provided for comprehensive judicial 
review, and indeed for the mechanism in Section 29, which itself had to be framed in 
general language, to have any use, it needed to be judicially enforceable against 
inconsistent ordinary legislation. Perhaps he may have calculated that the narrower 
scope of Section 29, in contrast to a fully formed bill of rights, would curb the 
litigation industry he feared.  
 
Jennings says more about his objections to the use of bills of rights to prevent racial, 
religious and caste discrimination in The Approach to Self-Government:  
 
one cannot change deeply imbedded social ideas by constitutional guarantees. 
It has been said that one cannot make people good by Act of Parliament. It 
should be added that one cannot overthrow a social system by drafting a 
Constitution.63  
 8 
 
Here is a clear illustration of the tension between the methodology and the substantive 
ideas of functionalist constitutionalism in application to a communally plural Asian 
society. Social and political modernity was the ultimate good, but it could not be 
achieved without regard to the ethnographic reality. It could perhaps be argued this 
was no tension at all, given that the British functionalists, while prepared to use 
legislation as an instrument of social change and modernisation, were also 
pragmatists, empiricists and incrementalists who knew the limits of legislative 
instrumentalism.64 But it is important to distinguish between ordinary legislation and 
constitutionally entrenched rights, which is the key to understanding Jennings’ 
antipathy to the latter. Legislation is a flexible policy instrument of regularly elected 
(and similarly disposable) governments. By contrast, constitutional entrenchment of 
putatively immutable values in the form of justiciable rights imposes a ‘temporal 
imperialism’ 65  on the legislative freedom of government, especially that of a 
developing society.  
 
While the rejection of a bill of rights would not have been a difficult choice in Ceylon 
– Senanayake conceivably was not an enthusiast and the Tamils were more concerned 
with ‘balanced representation’66 – there was of course no choice about whether to 
have a written constitution. It followed logically from that, although not necessarily, 
that judicial review of legislation should be available, if the written constitution was 
to be treated as supreme law. In addition to this theoretical logic, there was moreover 
a crucial practical reason of law from which it followed that legislative acts should be 
judicially reviewable. As Jennings pointed out in a note on the Privy Council’s 
decision in Ranasinghe, the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 applied to Ceylon at the 
time the independence constitution was being drafted (1943-1947), and as such, there 
was no possibility that it could provide for a legislature that was ‘sovereign’ in the 
same sense as the Imperial Parliament. I will discuss this case in more detail below, 
but Jennings was blunt when he stated that if the Privy Council had not held ‘that the 
Ceylon Parliament was sovereign, it would be unnecessary to say that none of the 
draftsmen had any such intention.’67  
 
Given this legal reality, Jennings abandoned a strict adherence to functionalist beliefs, 
and his acceptance of this defining principle of liberal normativism is blandly set out 
in The Constitution of Ceylon: ‘it is customary, in democratic Constitutions, to impose 
limitations on legislative power. That power is in fact, though not in theory, vested in 
the majorities in the legislature for the time being, and it is considered dangerous not 
to limit it.’ 68  Notwithstanding this concession to practical realities, we find his 
functionalism reasserting itself in not extending the scope of judicial review by way 
 9 
of a justiciable bill of rights. Nevertheless, the availability of comprehensive judicial 
review entailed the enshrinement of an implicit but robust conception of the 
separation of powers in the independence constitution that is quite incongruous with 
the functionalist style. This led to such landmark cases as Liyanage v. R (1967),69 a 
decision described by S.A. de Smith as ‘founded entirely on constitutional 
implications drawn from a version of the separation of powers doctrine,’ which was 
‘possibly the most remarkable exercise in judicial activism ever performed by the 
Privy Council.’ 70  
 
So to sum up: in coming to the conclusion that a written constitution and 
constitutional minority protections supervised by the courts were inescapable 
elements of constitution-making in Ceylon, in addition to the legal obligations of the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act, Jennings would have been helped by the methodological 
approach of the functionalist style, namely, sociological observation as the foundation 
of constitutional theorising and institutional design. The principal social consideration 
in Ceylon was the issue of communal pluralism. While committed normatively to the 
overarching liberal paradigm of modernist nation-building in addressing this problem, 
it is this functionalist trait that allowed him to methodologically incorporate the issue 
of communalism – or in more contemporary language, ethno-cultural identity – into 
constitution-making. If Jennings was a liberal normativist, arguably his approach 
would have depended more on philosophical first principles that a constitution 
conceived in abstract terms ought to reflect, rather than designing institutions by 
reference to social realities. 71  But this methodological commitment to empirical 
investigation led logically to a substantive requirement of constitutionally entrenched 
minority protections that could only be secured by the provision of constitutional 
review, which in turn meant that he had to concede a key tenet of liberal normativism. 
He explained this compromise in the following way: 
 
a Constitution ought to be acceptable to the great mass of the people. A 
proposal should never be rejected on purely theoretical grounds. If there is a 
real demand for constitutional guarantees they ought to be inserted, and the 
task of the draftsman should be to make them as flexible as possible.72  
 
From his work in Ceylon then, we can see that when the circumstances demanded it, 
Jennings could be flexible about ideological and theoretical preconceptions, but only 
up to a point. It is a counterfactual question whether a positive bill of rights (including 
group differentiated rights) akin to the Indian constitution might have better served 
the ends of minority protection, and democratic nation-building more generally, than 
the negative limitation of legislative power in Section 29.73 Instead of assuming these 
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values to be inherent to the political culture of a Westminster-style system, or indeed, 
relying on the moderate statesmanship of a dominant figure like Senanayake, such a 
device would have made both explicit and justiciable the core liberties and the 
concomitant limitations on the institutionalised power of the democratic majority, and 
provided the positive basis for modernist nation-building in the way the constitution 
has served its purpose in post-colonial India.74 Or perhaps it may not have made any 
difference at all, in view of the deeper political forces of historiographically impelled 
cultural renaissance that took post-colonial Ceylon in a fundamentally ethnicised 
majoritarian direction after 1956.75 But certainly the consideration of his work in 
Ceylon tells us much that is useful about the intellectual tensions and ideological 
compromises that Jennings would have struggled with, and the impact of those 
tensions in the constitutional scheme he drafted for Ceylon.  
 
 
3. Theory to Practice: ‘Manner and Form’ and the Independence 
Constitution  
 
Jennings’ most inventive contribution to British constitutional law, one that has 
received renewed interest in the light of recent cases such as Jackson and Thoburn, 
was the argument that the sovereignty of parliament was not affected by procedural 
limitations placed on the exercise of legislative power. 76  By the time Jennings 
propounded this argument in the first edition of The Law and the Constitution in 
1933, Dicey’s exposition of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty had become the 
dominant orthodoxy of the British constitution. As he remarked in The Road to 
Peradeniya, ‘I was a young man of 30 and I was attacking, not always very politely, 
ideas which had been not merely held but cherished for 50 years.’ 77  Dicey’s 
formulation of the doctrine was uncomplicated, which is part of the reason for its 
enduring appeal, including in Ceylon / Sri Lanka. In this view, Parliament has ‘the 
right to make or unmake any law whatever’ and further, no person or body has ‘a 
right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.’78 Neil MacCormick sets 
out the full implications of the doctrine in more complete form:  
 
“Parliament has an unrestricted and general power to enact valid law, subject 
only to two disabilities, namely, a disability to enact norms disabling 
Parliament on any future occasion from enjoying the same unrestricted and 
general power, and a disability to enact laws that derogate from the former 
disability.”79 
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In the context of the unwritten British constitution, Jennings did not deny that 
Parliament could legislate on any substantive matter it chose to. His challenge related 
to the second limb of Dicey’s formulation, in which he sought to establish the 
proposition that Parliament could, without impairing the substantive legal competence 
of its successors, lay down special procedures with regard to the manner and form in 
which any particular piece or class of legislation should in future be amended or 
repealed.80 The logic of this he set out in the following terms: 
 
“Legal sovereignty” [i.e., parliamentary sovereignty, in Dicey’s terms81] is 
merely a name indicating that the legislature has for the time being power to 
make laws of any kind in the manner required by the law. That is, a rule 
expressed to be made by the [Queen-in-Parliament], will be recognised by the 
courts, including a rule which alters this law itself. If this is so, the “legal 
sovereign” may impose legal limitations upon itself, because its power to 
change the law includes the power to change the law affecting itself.82  
 
Contrary to Dicey, therefore, for Jennings, ‘legal sovereignty is not sovereignty at all. 
It is not supreme power.’83 As he explained,  
 
It is a legal concept, a form of expression which lawyers use to express the 
relations between Parliament and the courts. It means that the courts will 
always recognise as law the rules which Parliament makes by legislation; that 
is, rules made in the customary manner and expressed in the customary 
form.84  
 
It is on this terrain of disagreement that most of the theoretical battles have been 
fought within British constitutional law, and as I will show, he transparently put these 
principles into practice in drafting the scheme of legislative power in Ceylon. But 
there was another element in Jennings’ argument (largely ignored in the British 
debates) that is important in considering the Ceylon case, and that concerned his 
observations on Dicey’s distinction between ‘sovereign’ and ‘non-sovereign’ 
legislatures. Again it is important for us that he did not question the validity of 
Dicey’s distinction itself, because he clearly applied the distinction in describing the 
Ceylonese legislature under the independence constitution as non-sovereign, as noted 
above. Rather, his criticism was that Dicey categorised under the non-sovereign rubric 
a widely different set of law-making bodies (such as dominion legislatures as well as 
town councils), which clearly cannot be, and the law did not, treat the same. As he 
noted, 
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in modern constitutional law it is frequently said that a legislature is 
“sovereign within its powers.” This is, of course, pure nonsense if sovereignty 
is supreme power, for there are no “powers” of a sovereign body; there is only 
the unlimited power which sovereignty implies. But if sovereignty is merely a 
legal phrase for legal authority to pass any sort of laws, it is not entirely 
ridiculous to say that a legislature is sovereign in respect of certain subjects, 
for it may then pass any sort of laws on those subjects, but not any other 
subjects.85 
 
Commonwealth legislatures like Ceylon, whose powers were derived from a written 
constitution, enjoy legislative powers of this nature, whereas local authorities or other 
subordinate law-making bodies clearly do not.86 Both are judicially reviewable, but 
unlike secondary law-making bodies whose powers are narrowly defined and subject 
to more stringent principles of judicial review, legislatures under written constitutions 
enjoy a wide ambit of legislative power.87 Thus, 
 
The only function of the courts is to determine whether legislation is within 
the limits of these powers, and these powers are wide general powers, which 
may be called powers of government.88  
 
These then were the instruments in Jennings’ theoretical toolbox when he commenced 
work on the Ministers’ Draft in June 1943. As they applied to Ceylon, they included 
the following propositions. Parliamentary ‘sovereignty’ was a misnomer in the sense 
that the legislature did not posses illimitable and indivisible power. In truth what was 
meant was that the courts would respect and give effect to the lawful commands of 
the legislature expressed in the legally accepted form. It followed from this that the 
equation of the ‘sovereignty’ of the legislature with the sovereignty of the state of 
which it was a branch was a fundamental conceptual error. The absence of a 
constitutionally uncontrolled legislature did not affect the independence of the state, 
and this in turn meant that legislative power, although limited, was ample for the 
effective conduct of government. Legislative power could be limited in general terms, 
i.e., within the terms of the power-conferring written constitution, and ordinary 
legislation repugnant to those terms would be void. And it could also be limited in 
specific terms, for example, where some measures could not be enacted by process of 
ordinary legislation, and would require some higher form of legislation that would 
require greater agreement around the measure. According to the terms of the 
constitution, these may have to be in the form of amendments to the constitution 
itself. It followed from the constitutionally limited and procedurally regulated nature 
of legislative power that its exercise should be policed by the courts. In doing so, 
 13 
courts would seek to uphold substantive and procedural constitutionality within the 
law for the time being in place, although it was ultimately open to the democratic 
legislature to change these rules following constitutional process.   
 
These principles clearly guided the scheme of legislative power that Jennings put into 
the Ministers Draft.89 This scheme provided the law-making power of the Parliament 
for the peace, order and good government of Ceylon, subject to two restrictions.90 The 
first denied Parliament the power to enact ordinary legislation that would: prohibit or 
restrict the free exercise of any religion; or subject any community or religion to any 
disabilities or restrictions that were not imposed on any other community of religion; 
or confer on any community or religion any privileges or advantages that were not 
conferred on any other community or religion; or alter the constitution of any 
religious body without the approval of the relevant governing body. 91  Legislative 
power also included the power of constitutional amendment, provided that the 
amending legislation obtained a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives 
and could not be presented for assent to the Governor-General unless this requirement 
had been met. This provision excluded judicial review of the legislative process 
because that would involve courts in parliamentary procedure.92 But the scheme did 
also provide that any constitutional amendment must be by express words, so that any 
future legislation could not be held to have impliedly amended the constitution.93 By 
this requirement, the courts could supervise the constitutionality of both ordinary 
legislation and constitutional amendments without the need to investigate the 
legislative process (i.e., to establish whether the two-thirds majority had been met).  
 
In what became Section 29 of the Ceylon Constitution Order-in-Council 1946,94 this 
scheme was altered in three respects significant to the present discussion. First, the 
prohibitions on discriminatory legislation were reproduced but with an addition of a 
repugnancy clause. 95  This created a textual anomaly in that while the minority 
protections Section 29 (2) were further protected by a repugnancy clause, the equally 
important power of constitutional amendment in Section 29 (4) was not similarly 
clarified by a repugnancy clause.96  Second, the requirement of express words for 
constitutional amendments was omitted, meaning that potentially, future legislation 
could be held to impliedly amend the constitution even if it had not been passed by 
the procedure for constitutional amendments. Although noted as a potential difficulty 
by Jennings at the time, it was not insisted upon by the Ceylonese Ministers. 97 
Thirdly, Section 29 (4), which concerned constitutional amendments, introduced an 
additional requirement whereby the two-thirds majority would have to be certified by 
the Speaker. Jennings took the view that ‘the Speaker’s certificate must have been 
intended to enable the courts to ascertain whether an assented Bill had been approved 
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by the requisite majority, and had therefore brought in judicial review by a side-
wind.’98  
 
A comparison of these two versions of the scheme shows that Jennings’ draft was 
obviously more in line with his thinking on legislative power within the Westminster 
system, especially the exclusion of judicial review over the constitutional amendment 
procedure and the requirement of express words. Nevertheless, the eventual 
framework in Section 29, while providing for a stronger form of judicial review over 
constitutional amendments by the requirement of the Speaker’s certificate rather than 
express words, did not categorically depart from the ‘manner and form’ model and 
this was why Jennings was able to agree to them at the time. In judicial interpretation, 
however, these small differences led to the transmogrification of Section 29 into an 
incoherent stipulation that pleased no one, and in the febrile atmosphere of nationalist 
politics in the 1960s, a gift for political opportunists and constitutional revolutionaries 
bent on doing away with the liberal democratic independence constitution. As M.J.A. 
Cooray has observed, ‘The uncertainty which prevailed regarding the nature of the 
prohibition couched in section 29 (2) undoubtedly contributed to the inclination 
towards the replacement of the Constitution completely.’99 
 
The manner and form model was intended to balance the protection of minority 
interests with majoritarian democracy, by structuring the exercise of legislative power 
so as to ensure discriminatory legislation was not passed by ordinary process. While it 
was open to the legislature to change or repeal these restrictions, that would have to 
be undertaken by way of the constitutional amendment procedure, which would 
necessarily require a higher threshold of democratic agreement, possibly involving the 
consent of the minorities. Democratic legitimacy was also the concern in giving the 
courts a carefully calibrated role, rather than a power of strong constitutional review 
on the Marbury v. Madison model.100 It appears that understanding these underlying 
principles of Section 29 required a capacity for theoretical sophistication that, in most 
cases, the judiciary did not posses. In a very early case, the decision of Basnayake, J. 
in Kulasingam v. Thambiayah (1948) 101  suggested, as Jennings noted somewhat 
anxiously, that ‘it is possible for a Court to take a view very different from that of the 
draftsman; for the draftsman knows what was intended while the Court has to 
interpret the letter of the law.’102  
 
While some judges did appreciate the implications of the scheme, for example, T.S. 
Fernando, J. in The Queen v. Liyanage (1962) noted that, ‘Nor do we have a 
sovereign Parliament in the sense that the expression is used in with reference to the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom,’103 more typical was the judgment in Piyadasa v. 
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The Bribery Commissioner (1962). In this case, Tambiah, J. stated that, ‘It is hardly 
necessary to state that the Ceylon Constitution, being a written constitution, is 
paramount legislation which can only be amended (and that too, only in certain 
respects) by a two-thirds majority of the members of the House of Representatives as 
provided by section 29 (4) of the Ceylon Constitution’104  while maintaining that, 
‘Section 29 (2) and (3) prohibits the Parliament from passing certain discriminatory 
legislation, except by a two-thirds majority of the members of the House of 
Representatives.’105 These comments appear to lack logical consistency inasmuch as 
they support both the substantive and procedural views with regard to the restrictions 
on legislative power, without apparent regard to the fact that if the constitution could 
be amended ‘only in certain respects’ (i.e., that it contained absolute limitations 
against its amendment), then the legislative power of constitutional amendment in 
Section 29 (4) could not, at the same time, extend to those absolutely entrenched 
provisions. There would have been no inconsistency in this position, however, if 
Tambiah, J. had referred to a constitutional entrenchment of certain matters against 
ordinary legislation, rather than the legislative power of constitutional amendment.106  
 
If confusion reigned in the Supreme Court of Ceylon, then the situation was no 
different in the Privy Council. In The Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe, Lord 
Pearce, speaking for the Board, for the most part affirmed the manner and form 
position. Thus he noted that, ‘a legislature has no power to ignore the conditions of 
law-making that are imposed by the instrument which itself regulates its power to 
make law.’107 He went on to hold that,  
 
Such a constitution can indeed be altered or amended by the legislature, if the 
regulating instrument so provides and if the terms of those provisions are 
complied with: and the alteration or amendment may include the change or 
abolition of those very provisions. The proposition which is not acceptable is 
that a legislature, once established, has some inherent power, derived from the 
mere fact of its establishment, to make a valid law by the resolution of a bare 
majority which its own constituent instrument has said shall not be a valid law 
unless made by a different type of majority or by a different legislative 
process.108  
 
So far so good, but the difficulty arose when he referred to the Parliament of Ceylon 
as a ‘sovereign’ legislature that was, nonetheless, bound by the prohibitions of 
Section 29 (2), which he described as,  
 
entrenched religious and racial matters, which are not to be the subject of 
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legislation. They represent the solemn balance of rights between the citizens 
of Ceylon, the fundamental conditions on which inter se they accepted the 
Constitution; and these are therefore unalterable under the Constitution.109  
As I have pointed out, this is not a matter in which the courts could have it both ways. 
Neither could either proposition – that the Ceylonese Parliament was sovereign or that 
the Ceylonese Constitution contained substantively and permanently entrenched 
provisions – stand alone, in view of the very nature of Section 29 reflecting a manner 
and form approach to legislative power. Lord Pearce’s comment about the 
inalterability of Section 29 (2) was of course obiter, but it did have momentous 
political consequences in convincing the Ceylonese Opposition about the need to 
establish a republic and to do so by way of a constitutional revolution, because that 
was the only method by which the purportedly ‘unalterable’ provisions shackling 
parliamentary sovereignty could be disposed of. It was ironic that his depiction of 
Ceylon as a sovereign state with a sovereign legislature was studiously ignored.110   
 
It is perhaps appropriate to give Jennings the last word. In his note on Ranasinghe’s 
case, as noted above in the discussion on the effect of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 
he strenuously maintained the Ceylon constitutional drafter’s point of view that the 
(Diceyan) conception of parliamentary sovereignty as applied to the British 
Parliament was not intended to apply to the Ceylon Parliament (although like a good 
lawyer he also outlined three possible ways of supporting the argument that Ceylon’s 
parliament was sovereign). 111  As he further argued, the Ceylon Parliament was 
designed by reference to the way the Westminster Parliament actually worked, in 
which although what was ‘sovereign’ was the ‘Queen-in-Parliament’ in theory, in 
practice the monarch is hardly ever present in the daily operation of the legislative 
process in the two Houses. The difficulty in ascribing sovereignty to a Parliament that 
is designed by reference to this legislative practice of Westminster, rather than the 
accident of history that produces the quasi-mystical theory of the ‘Queen-in-
Parliament,’ is that it is impossible to locate the seat of sovereignty.  
 
An Act of the Ceylon Parliament is not passed by the Queen in that 
Parliament; it is approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate and 
then assented to by the Governor-General, wherever he happens to be – 
possibly on an elephant in his home town, or in a boat above the singing fish 
in Batticaloa.112 
 
As he wryly concluded, ‘it would have been better if the Judicial Committee had 
simply dismissed Dicey, with costs.’113 
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4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have attempted to shed some further light on Jennings’ contribution 
to Commonwealth public law and constitutional theory through his work in Ceylon. 
The discussions about the nation and nationalism and about central concerns of 
constitutionalism in a communally plural democracy will have, I hope, relevance for 
constitutional reform debates in Sri Lanka, which continues to grapple with many of 
the same questions that Jennings and his colleagues dealt with at the moment of 
independence. More broadly, I hope the discussion of his work in Ceylon is useful in 
some way to the renewed interest constitutional lawyers, political scientists and 
historians have recently shown in his work.  
 
Revisiting this era of Sri Lankan political and constitutional history, however, remains 
an inescapably wistful exercise. At the end of his centennial appraisal of Sir Ivor 
Jennings’ life and work in 2004, Anthony Bradley cites the following observation 
from Jennings’ last published work, Magna Carta and its Influence in the World 
Today:  
 
Most of the provisions in the Bills of Rights derive from [the] common law 
and therefore they never were mere paper propositions. They are peaks of high 
mountains, not clouds in the air.114  
 
Bradley goes on to remark, ‘I found this a moving image from the pen of someone 
who must have been aware that what he had drafted had often become ‘mere paper 
propositions.’’115 This sense of poignancy is nowhere more pungent than in the case 
of Ceylon, a country that at the moment of independence held so much promise as a 
beacon of Asian liberal democracy – or in Sir Oliver Goonetilleke’s racing simile, 
‘the best bet in Asia’116 – and to the constitutional development of which Sir Ivor had 
contributed much. By the time of his death, the train of events that would lead to the 
root and branch repudiation, not merely of the form of the independence 
constitutional order, but more importantly, its fundamental values, was well 
underway. In Sri Lanka, thus, the normative values of the liberal democratic 
Commonwealth tradition proved to be ephemeral clouds rather than scalable peaks.  
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